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2Abstract 
 
This article is simultaneously a comparative law piece about prisoner disenfranchisement 
in various countries, a transnational work of legal theory providing a framework for the use of 
foreign law in domestic constitutional courts, and a domestic analysis of the constitutional 
underpinnings of felon disenfranchisement. 
The article begins in Parts II-III with a comprehensive comparative analysis of the recent 
prisoner disenfranchisement decisions in Canada, South Africa, and Europe.  It notes that the 
over-arching theme in the decisions of all three courts, and of all the dissents, is to view the 
acceptability of prisoner disenfranchisement along a continuum, where it becomes more 
acceptable the more serious the offense committed.  It is this continuum idea that informs the 
latter parts of the article. 
In Part IV, the article examines the growing phenomenon of a “transnational judicial 
discourse” between domestic, foreign, and international courts.  This examination carefully 
distinguishes the more controversial universalist and genealogical interpretations of the 
transnational judicial discourse from the less controversial dialogical interpretation of the 
discourse which has been separately endorsed by six justices of the US Supreme Court.  The 
dialogical version of the transnational judicial discourse is less controversial because it is used 
only to generate ideas which are then subject to conventional, domestic constitutional tests; it 
does not import foreign doctrine.  The article then examines the transnational judicial discourse as 
it applies to felon disenfranchisement, suggesting that the concept of a continuum of applicability 
taken from the international cases can inform the domestic debate on felon disenfranchisement. 
The article synthesizes all of this material in Part V by revisiting the foundational 
Supreme Court decision on felon disenfranchisement, Richardson v. Ramirez, in the context of 
the transnational judicial discourse.  Using the comparative law materials in a dialogical manner, 
it applies the concept of a continuum of applicability for felon disenfranchisement to the US 
context.  Applying this concept functionally, it questions whether the framers in drafting the 
words “or other crime” in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment were actually sanctioning 
disenfranchisement for every kind of crime along the continuum of applicability.  To answer this 
question, it returns to the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that the law 
review Note relied on by the Ramirez Court is incorrect. While that Note claimed the words “or 
other crime” emerged mysteriously from the black box of congressional committee, a review of 
the legislative history shows they were actually contemplated in open session before entering 
committee.  This is significant, because the whole text of the plenary discussions has been 
preserved, whereas the Committee discussions have not.  Examining these plenary discussions, it 
is clear that the words “or other crime,” when taken in their proper context, were meant to refer to 
crimes of rebellion and disloyalty, particularly treason.  With this new understanding of the 
phrase, the article argues that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be read as 
affirmatively sanctioning the disenfranchisement of all felons; rather, the framers only intended 
the disenfranchisement of those committing crimes of rebellion or disloyalty to the State, such as 
treason.   
With the textual barrier removed and the door open to a more nuanced constitutional 
examination of felon disenfranchisement for various crimes, the article concludes by offering 
some predictions on what a continuum of applicability of felon disenfranchisement would look 
like under strict scrutiny analysis. 
3I. Introduction 
 
After the Supreme Court held in Richardson v. Ramirez that Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment affirmatively sanctioned felon disenfranchisement, there seemed little hope of 
reconstructing a fruitful legal debate on the topic.1 Until very recently, it appeared that the 
Ramirez decision was so inclusive, its textual reference so unforgiving, that the  exception for 
purposeful discriminatory intent enunciated in Hunter v. Underwood2 was the only possible 
modification of Ramirez’s bright line.  All of that has changed in recent years. 
The debate over felon disenfranchisement is now stronger than ever.  Federal appeals 
courts in three separate circuits have all voiced their skepticism of felon disenfranchisement’s 
compatibility with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).  First, in Farrakhan v. Washington, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court grant of summary judgment for the State, holding that 
“when felon disenfranchisement results in denial of the right to vote or vote dilution on account 
of race or color, Section 2 [of the VRA] affords disenfranchised felons the means to seek 
redress.”3 Second, although the decision was vacated pending a rehearing en banc,4 the Eleventh 
Circuit decision in Johnson v. Bush announced a similar challenge to felon disenfranchisement 
under the VRA.5 Third, the Second Circuit has for the past decade been considering the 
 
1 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).  See infra notes 120-121 and accompanying text 
(discussing the opinion). 
2 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-33 (1985) (striking down Alabama’s felon disenfranchisement 
regime because its "original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account 
of race and the section continues to this day to have that effect."). 
3 Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003), rehearing en banc denied, 359 F.3d 1116 
(2004).  Although the district court characterized “Plaintiffs' evidence of discrimination in Washington's 
criminal justice system and the resulting disproportionate impact on minority voting power as 
‘compelling,’” it granted summary judgment for the State because the discrimination in question originated 
in the criminal justice system, external to the voting qualification itself.  The court thus reasoned that the 
voting qualification furthered, but did not cause, the disproportionate impact.  Id. at 1014, 1017.  In 
reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that under the “totality of the circumstances” test, even if 
the “the cause of [the] disparate impact on [minorities’] right to vote was external to the felon 
disenfranchisement provision itself, … [the felon disenfranchisement scheme]  could provide the requisite 
causal link between the voting qualification and the prohibited discriminatory result.” Id. at 1011. 
4 Johnson v. Bush, 377 F.3d 1163 (2004) (order for rehearing en banc). 
5 Johnson v. Bush, 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).  The district court granted of summary judgment for the 
State, establishing a presumption that “the re-enactment of the felon disenfranchisement provision in 
4narrower question of whether currently imprisoned felons have a claim under Section 2 of the 
VRA.  In Baker v. Pataki, an en banc panel split 5-5 over the question.6 More recently in 
Muntaqim v. Coombe, a three-judge panel held Section 2 of the VRA inapplicable to the state 
disenfranchisement statute because such an application would “alter the constitutional balance 
between the States and the Federal Government” and Congress had not given a “clear statement” 
of such an intent.7 This did not end discussion on the issue, however; it was reborn last 
December when the Second Circuit granted rehearing en banc.8
The debate over felon disenfranchisement is definitely no less alive in legislative halls, 
with the changes since 2000 alone enough to paint a very active picture.  Just as the court rulings 
are generally favorable to those advocating for felon voting rights – reopening a debate long 
silenced by Ramirez – the recent legislative action is also almost completely favorable to 
increased felon voting.  In Alabama, a conservative governor “signed legislation making it easier 
for ex-offenders to regain their voting rights.”9 Legislatures in Delaware and Maryland altered 
their laws to automatically restore the franchise to ex-felons after a post-sentence wait, subject to 
some exceptions; the Nevada legislature eliminated its five-year wait to apply for restoration of 
rights; Connecticut enfranchised probationers; and New Mexico ceased the disenfranchisement of 
ex-felons.  The only exception to this trend was Massachusetts, which voted to disenfranchise 
 
[Florida’s] 1968 [Constitution] cleansed Florida's felon disenfranchisement scheme of any invidious 
discriminatory purpose that may have prompted its inception in Florida's 1868 Constitution.”  Johnson v. 
Bush, 214 F. Supp 2d 1333, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2002).  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, refocusing the burden 
on the state to prove the 1968 constitution was free of discriminatory intent, and finding no non-
discriminatory reason in the record for retaining the felon-disenfranchisement provisions in the 
constitution.  353 F.3d at 1301.   
6 Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996). 
7 366 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2004).  Rehearing en banc denied, Muntaqim v. Coombe, 385 F.3d 793 (2d 
Cir. 2004); cert. denied, Muntaqim v. Coombe, 125 S. Ct. 480 (2004); rehearing en banc granted, 
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004). 
8 Muntaqim v. Coombe, 396 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2004). 
9 Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts:  Retribution, representation, and the Debate over Felon 
Disenfranchisement, Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 75, p. 1, available online at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs_05.cfm (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005). 
5inmates.10 A bill was also introduced in the U.S. Congress which would guarantee the right to 
vote in federal elections to all former felons who at the time of the election are no longer “serving 
a felony sentence in a correctional institution or facility.”11 Moreover, support for felon 
disenfranchisement in the public is falling.  One recent survey found that “over eighty percent of 
Americans believe that ex-offenders should regain their right to vote at some point, and more than 
forty percent would allow offenders on probation or parole to vote.”12 
There are many good reasons for this increased skepticism of felon disenfranchisement.  
First, the Circuit Court decisions cited above raise an important question regarding the potential 
role of felon disenfranchisement in race-based voting discrimination.  Second, some argue that 
felon disenfranchisement should be revisited because small margins of victory in recent elections 
make prison populations a potential swing vote.13 Third, many commentators maintain that felon 
disenfranchisement frustrates fair redistricting principles by counting prisoners for redistricting 
purposes but then not counting their vote.14 None of these is the focus of this article.  Rather than 
add one more voice to the masses which are arguing, in various ways, that felon 
disenfranchisement is wrong because of its functional outcomes, this article returns to the 
 
10 Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Summary of Changes to State Disenfranchisement Laws, 1865-2003 
(April, 2003), online at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs_05.cfm (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005). 
11 H.R. 259, Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 2003, § 3 (108th Congress, 1st Sess., Jan. 8, 2003). 
12 Karlan, supra note 9, at 1. 
13 See, e.g., Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction?  Political Consequences of Felon 
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 777, 792, 794 (2002) (using empirical 
evidence to prove that the 2000 presidential election “would almost certainly have been reversed had voting 
rights been extended to any category of disenfranchised felons,” that felon disenfranchisement altered the 
outcome of as many as seven  recent senate races, and that Democrats would likely have gained and kept 
majority control of the Senate from 1986 to the present in the absence of felon disenfranchisement). 
14 See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINOR’S CANARY 189-90, 265 (2002) (“The strategic 
placement of prisons in predominantly white rural districts often means that these districts gain more 
political representation based on the disenfranchised people in prison, while the inner-city communities 
these prisoners come from suffer a proportionate loss of political power and representation.”); Rosanna M. 
Taormina, Defying One-Person, One-Vote:  Prisoners and the “Usual Residence” Principle, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 431 (2003) (arguing that the “’usual residence’ principle, as applied to disenfranchised prisoners and 
former prisoners, cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence”); Brief 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Jalil Abdul Muntaqim, aka Anthony Bottom, Urging 
Reversal of the District Court, on Behalf of National Voting Rights Institute and Prison Policy Initiative, 
01-7260, submitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, available at 
http://www.nvri.org/about/new_york_state_policies.shtml (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005) (arguing that the 
Court should consider the redistricting implications of disenfranchisement as part of the “totality of 
circumstances” that must be examined in addressing the plaintiff’s Voting Rights Act claim). 
6forgotten argument that felon disenfranchisement is substantively wrong in itself.  As a 
constitutional matter, this argument has been foreclosed by the textual holding in Ramirez that the 
14th Amendment of United States Constitution affirmatively sanctioned the practice. This article 
argues for a reconsideration of that premise.  It does so by approaching the key phrase “or other 
crime” in section 2 of the 14th Amendment and re-examining whether the Framers truly intended 
that phrase to create the blanket disenfranchisement which it has come to support.  
Courts in South Africa, Canada, and Europe have all recently examined the practice of 
prisoner disenfranchisement,15 concluding in their respective jurisdictions that the practice, if 
appropriate at all, is appropriate only for the most serious crimes and never once the prison term 
is complete.  By engaging this international jurisprudence, this article follows the increasingly 
popular model of the “transnational judicial discourse” to make use of the ideas raised by the 
foreign courts, but not their doctrine or constitutional tests.  Although a voluminous body of 
literature exists criticizing felon disenfranchisement,16 and although some scholars have 
compared the U.S. situation to one other country,17 no scholar has yet synthesized all of the recent 
domestic and international decisions into one analysis.  Similarly, although some commentators 
have attempted to reopen the constitutional inquiry after Ramirez,18 no scholar has done so by a 
reinterpretation of the word “crime” in Section 2 of the 14th Amendment.  This article attempts 
both of these goals. 
 
15 The international courts discussed in this study refer to “prisoner disenfranchisement,” rather than “felon 
disenfranchisement.”   I retain the distinction for clarity to help distinguish whether I am speaking of 
domestic or international practice.  The term “prisoner disenfranchisement” used in the international 
jurisdictions is also narrower and more appropriate to those jurisdictions, because it does not contemplate 
any possibility of disenfranchising former prisoners.   
16 See, e.g., works cited at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pubs_05.cfm (last accessed Mar. 2, 2005) 
(which represents just the tip of the iceberg). 
17 See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of 
Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753 (2000); Debra Parkes, Ballot Boxes 
Behind Bars:  Toward the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 71 (2003). 
18 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the 
Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment? 92 GEO. L.J. 259 (2004); Karlan, 
supra note 9 (arguing that felon disenfranchisement violates the 8th Amendment ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
7In Part II, I undertake a descriptive analysis of the recent prisoner disenfranchisement 
decisions in Canada, South Africa, and Europe.  In the Canadian context, I contrast a unanimous 
decision of the Supreme Court in 1993 finding a blanket disenfranchisement of all prisoners 
unconstitutional with a much closer 5-4 decision in 2002 invalidating a disenfranchisement law 
limited to inmates serving sentences of two years or more.  In South Africa, the new 
Constitutional Court after extensive reference to the Canadian decisions held by a 9-2 vote that a 
provision denying the right to vote to prisoners serving sentences without the option of a fine was 
unconstitutional.  Finally, the European Court of Human Rights, also after examination of the 
Canadian case, unanimously concluded that a British law denying the vote to all prisoners, 
irrespective of the length of their sentence or gravity of their offense, violated Protocol No. 1 to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of 
Europe. 
In Part III, I undertake a comparative analysis of the international decisions.  I conclude 
that the decisions differ in six principle ways.  First, the extent of prisoner disenfranchisement 
was different in each case.  Second, the government justifications for prisoner disenfranchisement 
varied.  Third, the courts were not uniform in the level of constitutional scrutiny they applied to 
prisoner disenfranchisement.  Fourth, the cases accorded varying levels of attention to 
comparative law materials.  Fifth, the cases enjoyed differing levels of agreement among the 
justices.  Sixth, although all three Courts applied a similar test of constitutional scrutiny, each 
court’s final holding rested on a different stage in that inquiry.  I then consider two principle and 
important similarities between the decisions.  First, all three courts relied on an astonishingly 
similar test of constitutional scrutiny.  Second, and most important, the over-arching theme in the 
analysis of all three courts, and of all the dissents, was to view the acceptability of prisoner 
disenfranchisement along a continuum, where it becomes more acceptable the more serious the 
offense committed.  It is this important idea that informs the latter Parts of this article. 
8In Part IV, I discuss the growing phenomenon of a “transnational judicial discourse.”  
First, I discuss this discourse generally as it has been understood by justices of the United States 
Supreme Court.  This examination carefully distinguishes the more controversial universalist and 
genealogical interpretations of the transnational judicial discourse from less controversial 
dialogical interpretation of the discourse which has been separately endorsed by six of the Court’s 
current justices.  The dialogical version of the transnational judicial discourse is less controversial 
because it is used only to generate ideas which are then subject to conventional, domestic 
constitutional tests; it absolutely does not import foreign doctrine.  Second, I examine the 
transnational judicial discourse as it applies to felon disenfranchisement, returning to my 
conclusions in Part III and suggesting that the international cases are useful because of their 
notion of a continuum of applicability of prison disenfranchisement based on the seriousness of 
the offense. 
The article synthesizes all of this material in Part V by revisiting Richardson v. Ramirez 
in the context of the transnational judicial discourse.  Using the comparative law materials in a 
dialogical manner (to stimulate ideas, not import doctrine), it applies the concept of a continuum 
of applicability for felon disenfranchisement to the U.S. context.  Applying this concept 
functionally, it questions whether the framers in drafting the words “or other crime” in section 2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment were actually referring to every kind of crime along the continuum 
of applicability.  To answer this question, it returns to the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, finding that the law review Note relied on by the Ramirez Court is incorrect. While 
that Note claimed the words “or other crime” emerged mysteriously from the black box of 
congressional committee, a review of the legislative history shows they were actually 
contemplated in open session before entering committee.  This is significant, because the whole 
text of the plenary discussions has been preserved, whereas the Committee discussions have not.  
Examining these plenary discussions, it is clear that the words “or other crime” when taken in 
their proper context, were meant to refer to crimes of rebellion and disloyalty, particularly 
9treason.  With this new understanding of the phrase, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment thus 
only affirmatively sanctions the disenfranchisement of those committing crimes of rebellion or 
disloyalty to the State, such as treason.  With the textual bar now removed with respect to most 
crimes, felon disenfranchisement can thus be examined through means-end constitutional scrutiny 
as has become the practice for other first-generation voting rights issues.  The Part concludes with 
a substantive application of the continuum of applicability of felon disenfranchisement.  With the 
textual barrier removed and the door open to a more nuanced constitutional examination of felon 
disenfranchisement for various crimes, the Part offers some predictions on what a continuum of 
applicability of felon disenfranchisement would look like under strict scrutiny analysis.  The 
article concludes that the time has come to revisit the original textual premise in Ramirez, accept 
a narrower reading of section 2 of the 14th Amendment, and develop a more nuanced approach to 
the applicability of felon disenfranchisement. 
II. Descriptive Summary of International Decisions 
 
a. Canada 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states in s.3 that “Every citizen of Canada 
has the right to vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative 
assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.”19 Nevertheless, a Canadian law passed in 
1985 prohibited prisoners from voting while in prison, regardless of the length of their 
sentences.20 That law was challenged in the 1993 case of Sauvé v. Canada (Sauvé 1), and the 
Supreme Court held unanimously that such a blanket ban was an unconstitutional denial of the 
right to vote guaranteed by s. 3.21 The Canadian Parliament responded to that decision by 
replacing the blanket prisoner disenfranchisement law with a new law denying the right to vote 
 
19 CANADIAN CHARTER RTS & FREEDOMS, S.3. 
20 Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2 , ss. 51(e) [rep. & sub. 1993, c. 19, s. 23(2)], 51.1 
[ad. idem, s. 24]. 
21 Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General), 2 S.C.R. 438 (1993) (hereinafter “Sauvé 1”). 
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only to inmates serving sentences of two years or more, codified in s. 51(e) of the Canada 
Elections Act22 The reformulated law produced new litigation, leading in 2002 to the important 
decision in the area of prisoner disenfranchisement announced in Sauvé v. Canada (Sauvé 2).23 
In Sauvé 2, the Crown conceded that s. 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act presumptively 
violated the voting rights provision of s. 3 of the Charter; thus, the Supreme Court proceeded 
directly to constitutional justification analysis.24 It stated that “the government bears the burden 
of proving a valid objective and showing that the rights violation is warranted -- that is, that it is 
rationally connected, causes minimal impairment, and is proportionate to the benefit achieved.”25
Although the word “rational” is used, the addition of the minimal impairment and proportionality 
tests suggests that the majority’s formulation corresponds to some level of heightened scrutiny 
analysis in American constitutional jurisprudence.  Moreover, the majority clearly distinguishes 
the more deferential approach taken by the dissent, noting that “[t]he right to vote is fundamental 
to our democracy and the rule of law and cannot be lightly set aside. Limits on it require not 
deference, but careful examination.”26 
Proceeding to the application of the test, the Court noted that the government asserted 
two objectives for the denial of prisoner voting rights: (1) to enhance civic responsibility and 
respect for the rule of law; and (2) to provide additional punishment, enhancing the general 
purposes of the criminal sanction.27 Expressing criticism at the broad nature of these objectives,28 
22 s. 51(e) (S.C. 1993, c. 19, s. 23). 
23 Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 3 S.C.R. 519, 2002 S.C.C 68 (2002) (hereinafter “Sauvé 2”). 
24 The basis for Constitutional scrutiny under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is established 
in its S.1:  “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.  Constitutional review under this article is a two-part means-ends inquiry known as the 
Oakes test for the case in which it was developed:  “To justify the infringement of a Charter right, the 
government must show that the infringement achieves a constitutionally valid purpose or objective, and that 
the chosen means are reasonable and demonstrably justified.”  R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103 (1986). 
25 Sauvé 2, supra note 23, at para. 7.   
26 Id. at para. 8. 
27 Id. at para. 21. 
28 The Court was highly critical of the general nature of these objectives, stating that “people should not be 
left guessing about why their Charter rights have been infringed.”28 In this regard, it noted that the first 
objective “could be asserted of virtually every criminal law and many non-criminal measures” and that the 
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the Court proceeded to the first prong of Canadian constitutional scrutiny, determining whether a 
rational connection exists between the stated objectives and the denial of prisoner voting.  The 
Government had advanced three theories in support of this rational connection:  (1) that depriving 
prisoners of the vote sends an "educative message" about the importance of respect for the law to 
both prisoners and the society at large; (2) that allowing penitentiary inmates to vote "demeans" 
the political system; and (3) that disenfranchisement is a legitimate form of punishment, 
regardless of the nature of the crime or circumstances of the offender.29
First, the Court dismissed the “educative message” theory as bad pedagogy, stating that 
“denying penitentiary inmates the right to vote is more likely to send messages that undermine 
respect for the law and democracy than messages that enhance those values”30 because it is in 
such stark contrast to “Canada's steady march to universal suffrage,”31 taking Canada “backwards 
in time and retrench[ing] … democratic entitlements.”32 Second, the Court also dismissed the 
government’s argument that prisoner voting was demeaning to the political system, stating that 
such an argument was premised on the idea of voting as privilege rather than right and in the 
concept of civil death, both of which rendered obsolete by s. 3.33 Finally, the Court also 
dismissed the government’s third argument, reasoning that a blanket prisoner disenfranchisement 
was arbitrary and concluding that it fulfilled none of the traditional goals of imprisonment:  
deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and denunciation.34 
second objective was also vague because Parliament had not clarified how, exactly, such a punishment 
would enhance the criminal sanction.  Sauvé 2, supra note 23, at paras. 24-24. 
29 Id. at para. 29. 
30 Id. at para. 41. 
31 Id. at para. 33. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at paras. 42-44. 
34 Id. at paras. 48-53.  The Court quickly reached this conclusion with regard to deterrence and 
rehabilitation, stating that “[n]either the record nor common sense supports the claim that 
disenfranchisement deters crime or rehabilitates criminals. On the contrary, as Mill recognized long ago, 
participation in the political process offers a valuable means of teaching democratic values and civic 
responsibility.”  Id. at para. 49.  The Court concludes that prisoner disenfranchisement could not 
legitimately further the goals of retribution and denunciation because a blanket disenfranchisement was not 
individually tailored enough to necessarily reflect the moral culpability of the individual prisoner or the 
crime committed.  Id. at para. 50. 
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Because the Court found no rational connection between prisoner disenfranchisement and 
the government’s three objectives, it did not need to proceed to the minimum impairment or 
proportionality inquiries, although it stated in dicta that a bright line disenfranchising all prisoners 
with sentences of two years or more would be highly suspect under both of these tests.35 The 
Court likewise did not consider the alternative argument that prisoner disenfranchisement 
infringes the equality guarantee of Charter s. 15(1).36 Thus, the Canadian Supreme Court 
concluded by a 5-4 vote that prisoner disenfranchisement applicable to all prisoners while they 
serve a sentence of two years or more was unconstitutional. 
A fifty page dissent argued that because the constitutional question rested on 
“philosophical, political and social considerations which are not capable of ‘scientific proof,’” it 
was appropriate to give Parliament significant deference.37 After a lengthy discussion of 
criminology and penology and overview of international trends in prisoner disenfranchisement, 
the dissent found both of the government’s objectives to be pressing and substantial.38 The 
relaxed, deferential scrutiny of the dissent is especially clear in its minimal impairment and 
proportionality inquiries, which presented no significant challenge at all to the impugned 
provisions.39 The dissent concluded that “[w]hile it has been conceded that [the 
disenfranchisement law] does infringe s. 3 of the Charter, the infringement is a reasonable limit 
that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”40 
b. South Africa 
 
The 1996 South African Constitution states in section 19(3)(a) that “[e]very adult citizen 
has the right … to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of the 
 
35 Id. at paras. 54-62. 
36 Id. at para. 63. 
37 Id. at para. 67. 
38 Id. at para. 148. 
39 Id. at paras. 160-77. 
40 Id. at para. 207. 
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Constitution.”41 In the early years of the new constitution, the relationship between this 
provision and prisoner disenfranchisement was unclear, because no law existed outright denying 
prisoners the right to vote.  In August and Another v. Electoral Commission and Others, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa held that the Electoral Commission could not disenfranchise 
prisoners by failing to accommodate prison voting, but it did not reach the hypothetical question 
of whether affirmative legislation disenfranchising prisoners would withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.42 In response to this case, the South African legislature enacted the Electoral Laws 
Amendment Act,43 amending the Electoral Act44 so as to clearly disenfranchise in section 
24(B)(2) all prisoners serving sentences of imprisonment without the option of a fine.45 The Act 
further disenfranchises prisoners who have already been released on election day by preventing 
them in section 8(2)(f) from registering as voters once in prison.46 In the weeks leading up to 
national and provincial legislative elections in South Africa in 2004, the provisions were 
challenged as a matter of urgency in the case of Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for 
Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders (NICRO) and others (hereinafter 
“NICRO”).47 
Constitutional scrutiny in South Africa is governed by section 36 of the Constitution and 
cases interpreting it.48 That section provides that constitutional rights can only be limited if 
 
41 CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, SEC. 19(3)(a). 
42 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC). 
43 Act 34 of 2003. 
44 Act 73 of 1998. 
45 Minister of Home Affairs v. National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders 
(NICRO) and others, case CCT 03/04 (Mar. 3, 2004).  According to the Director-General of Home Affairs 
of South Africa, “it was appreciated that in the [sic] light of this judgment, unless the position of prisoners 
was addressed in legislation, arrangements would have to be made for them to vote.”  NICRO, supra, at 
para. 43. 
46 NICRO, supra note 45, at para. 31 (explaining that if prisoners “had not registered before being 
imprisoned and are released from prison after the voters’ roll has closed but before the day of the elections, 
they will not be able to vote even though they are no longer in prison.”). 
47 Id. 
48 See, e.g., S v Manamela and Another (Director-General of Justice intervening) 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC); 
2000 (5) BCLR 491 (CC) para. 32; Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 
757 (CC); 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC) para. 31; Moise v Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council: 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development intervening (Women’s Legal Centre as amicus curiae) 
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“reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including the nature of the right; the 
importance of the purpose of the legislation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve that purpose.”49 The 
presence of the less-restrictive means component suggests a form of heightened scrutiny.   
Applying the section 36 test, the NICRO Court first examined the three purposes for the 
legislation put forth by the government.  The first purpose advanced was an effort to maintain the 
“integrity of the voting process.”  Under this rationale, because all attempts to accommodate 
special categories of voters through efforts such as mobile voting stations involved risks of 
interference or tampering, such special arrangements should be limited.  If such efforts had to be 
limited, the government argued that it was more legitimate to disenfranchise prisoners than any 
other voter who would be unable to travel to standard polling stations, such as disabled voters, 
pregnant voters, or absentee voters.50 The Court rejected this argument, questioning the 
connection between accommodation of other groups and accommodation of prisoners; it 
concluded that “[t]he mere fact that it may be reasonable not to make special arrangements for 
particular categories of persons who are unable to reach or attend polling stations on election day 
does not mean that it is reasonable to disenfranchise prisoners.”51 The government’s second 
proposed purpose was the effort to minimize the cost of the voting process.  Like its “integrity of 
the voting process” argument, it submitted that because costs were prohibitively high to 
accommodate all classes of special-needs voters, prisoners were the most legitimate class of 
voters to disenfranchise.52 The Court wholly rejected this argument, stating that “[t]here is 
nothing to suggest that expanding … arrangements to include prisoners sentenced without the 
 
2001 (4) SA 491 (CC); 2001 (8) BCLR 765 (CC) para. 19; Phillips and Another v Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division and Others 2003 (3) SA 345 (CC); 2003 (4) BCLR 357 (CC) 
para. 20. 
49 CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, SEC. 36(1).   
50 NICRO, supra note 45, at paras. 40-41. 
51 Id. at para. 53. 
52 Id. at paras. 47-49. 
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option of a fine will in fact place an undue burden on the resources of the Commission. … In so 
far as this aspect of the case is concerned, the burden of justifying the limitation falls at the first 
hurdle and it is not necessary to engage in the proportionality analysis that would have been 
necessary if the factual underpinning for the contention based on lack of resources had been 
established.”53 The third purpose of disenfranchisement proposed by the government was to send 
a message to the public that the government was tough on crime, a message which both 
denounced crime and showed that citizens’ rights are connected to their duties.54 After extensive 
analysis of the Canadian Sauvé 2 case, which turned on a similar policy issue,55 the Court 
concluded that  
the present case is markedly different from Sauvé [2]. The main thrust of the 
justification in the present case was directed to the logistical and cost issues 
which cannot be sustained.  The policy issue has been introduced into the case 
almost tangentially.  In contrast, the detailed record in the second Sauvé case 
contained evidence which addressed the issues relevant to the policy decisions to 
disenfranchise prisoners, and the purpose that it would serve.  In the present case 
we have only statements such as that made by counsel that the government does 
not want to be seen to be soft on crime, and that … it would be unfair to others 
who cannot vote to allow prisoners to vote. … In short, we have wholly 
inadequate information on which to conduct the limitation analysis that is called 
for.56 
After rejecting all three of the government’s proposed purposes, the Court thus held that 
disenfranchising all prisoners serving sentences without the option of a fine was unconstitutional.  
This being the case, it did not proceed to examine the second claim proposed by the applicants, 
that prisoner disenfranchisement violated the right to equality.57 
A dissenting opinion by Justice Madala agreed with the majority that the provisions 
presumptively violated the constitutional right to vote, but disagreed on the justification analysis.  
Madala argued that the multi-pronged objectives of the government must be “read holistically as 
an attempt by government to inculcate responsibility in a society which, for decades, suffered the 
 
53 Id. at paras. 49-51. 
54 Id. at para. 55-57. 
55 See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text. 
56 NICRO, supra note 45, at paras. 66-67. 
57 Id. at para. 68. 
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ravages of apartheid.”58 In this regard, Madala criticized the majority’s reliance on the Canadian 
Sauvé 2 case, arguing that South Africa’s unique and tainted past required “uniquely South 
African solutions and that one cannot simply import into a South African situation a solution 
derived from another country.”59 This argument is unsatisfying: whereas the connection between 
apartheid and prisoner disenfranchisement is not self-evident, the similarities between the Sauvé 2 
case and the present case are difficult to deny.  Another dissenting opinion by Justice Ngcobo 
similarly agreed with the majority that the impugned provisions were presumptively invalid, but 
went on to conclude that the government had a legitimate interest in denouncing crime and 
promoting observance of civic duties and obligations.60 Nevertheless, Ngcobo concluded that the 
limitation on the right to vote was overbroad because it also applied to prisoners awaiting the 
outcome of an appeal, who were potentially innocent.61 Ngcobo would solve this problem by 
reading the phrase “serving a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine” to exclude 
prisoners awaiting appeal.62 
c. European Court of Human Rights 
 
Just three weeks after the South African Constitutional Court reached its decision in 
NICRO, the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “ECHR”) also made a landmark ruling 
in the area of prisoner disenfranchisement.  In the case of Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2),63 the 
ECHR considered a British law which disenfranchised all prisoners, regardless of their crime, for 
the entire time they are in prison.64 The main question in the case was whether the prisoner 
disenfranchisement law violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection 
 
58 Id. at para. 113. 
59 Id. at para. 114. 
60 Id. at paras. 134-45. 
61 Id. at para. 152. 
62 Id. at para. 153. 
63 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), European Ct. Hum. Rts. (Mar. 30, 2004). 
64 Representation of the People Act of 1983, sec. 3.1 (“A convicted person during the time that he is 
detained in a penal institution in pursuance of his sentence ...is legally incapable of voting at any 
parliamentary or local election.”). 
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, which states:  “The High 
Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature.”65 
After an extensive review of both the majority and dissenting opinions in the Canadian 
Sauvé 2 case,66 the Court proceeded to its examination of the tension between the British prisoner 
disenfranchisement law and Art. 3 of the Protocol.  It examined this tension under the test 
established in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium: “[The Court] has to satisfy itself that the 
conditions do not curtail the rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very essence 
and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and 
that the means employed are not disproportionate.”67 The Mathieu-Mohin test appears slightly 
relaxed in comparison to the scrutiny used in Canada or South Africa because although similar in 
all other respects, it does not mention minimum impairment.  Nevertheless, the Court was 
unwilling to entertain a level of scrutiny as relaxed as that proposed by the United Kingdom.  
When the British government argued that “under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 the right to vote was 
not absolute and that a wide margin of appreciation [relaxed scrutiny] was to be allowed to 
Contracting States,”68 the Court responded that although a margin of appreciation did exist, “the 
Court does not consider that a Contracting State may rely on the margin of appreciation to justify 
restrictions on the right to vote which have not been the subject of considered debate in the 
legislature and which derive, essentially, from unquestioning and passive adherence to a historic 
tradition.”69 
65 Optional Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
66 Hirst, supra note 63, at paras. 25-27. 
67 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium, judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23, § 52 (cited 
in Hirst, supra note 63, at para. 36). 
68 Id. at para. 32. 
69 Id. at para. 41. 
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The British government submitted two objectives in support of the prisoner 
disenfranchisement law.  First, the law served to prevent crime and punish offenders; second, it 
operated “to enhance civil responsibility and respect for the rule of law ‘by depriving those who 
have seriously breached the basic rules of society of the right to have a say in the way such rules 
are made for the duration of their sentence.’”70 These aims had both been accepted as legitimate 
in the case law of the European Commission for Human Rights, a predecessor to the ECHR.71 
Relying heavily on the Canadian Sauvé 2 decision,72 the Court however was deeply skeptical 
about both objectives.  First, the Court was concerned about the government’s ‘deter and punish’ 
objective in light of the fact that “the loss of the right to vote plays no overt role in the sentencing 
process in criminal cases in the United Kingdom.”73 Second, the Court was also deeply skeptical 
of the British government’s objective of enhancing civil responsibility and respect for the rule of 
law, stating that “there is no clear, logical link between the loss of vote and the imposition of a 
prison sentence, where no bar applies to a person guilty of crimes which may be equally anti-
social or ‘uncitizen-like’ but whose crime is not met by such a consequence.”74 Despite these 
concerns, the Court did not decide the case on this basis, preferring to leave this as dicta and 
strike down the law based on its lack of proportionality.75 In this regard, the Court held that an 
indiscriminate blanket disenfranchisement of all prisoners, irrespective of their crime or length of 
their imprisonment, could not possibly withstand the proportionality test.  The Court emphasized 
 
70 Hirst, supra note 63, at para. 42. 
71 Id. at para. 33. 
72 The deterrence objective pursued by the British government differed slightly from the retribution 
objective advanced in Sauvé 2.  Nevertheless, they are both goals of imprisonment and the Court seemed to 
feel this link was sufficient so as to be informed by the Canadian ruling.  Similarly, the Court noted that 
“Taking due account of the difference in text and structure of the Canadian Charter, the Court nonetheless 
finds that substance of the reasoning may be regarded as apposite in the present case.”  Id. at para. 43.  See 
also Id. at para. 45.  The second objective of upholding civic responsibility and respect for the law, on the 
other hand, was identical to that pursued by the Canadian government in Sauvé 2. 
73 Id. at para. 45. 
74 Id. at para. 46.  The Court agreed with the majority in Sauvé 2 that in fact removal of the vote in fact runs 
exactly contrary to “the rehabilitation of the offender as a law-abiding member of the community and 
undermines the authority of the law as derived from a legislature which the community as a whole votes 
into power.” 
75 Id. at para. 47. 
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that a blanket ban was overly-arbitrary, because a person serving a mere week-long prison 
sentence would be disenfranchised if an election happened to fall during that week.  The Court 
then considered the particular situation of the applicant, who was from a strategic perspective 
certainly the “ideal plaintiff.”  The applicant in the case “was a man with a gross personality 
disorder to such a degree that he was amoral.”76 He had completed his sentence, and was being 
detained solely because his personality disorder made him a potential danger to society.  The 
Court found it impossible to accept that a law premised on punishment but which catches such a 
case within its reach could be considered proportional.77 Finally, the Court found “no evidence 
that the legislature in the United Kingdom has ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to 
assess the proportionality of the ban as it affects convicted prisoners.”78 The Court thus 
concluded that the blanket ban on prisoner voting imposed in the United Kingdom breached 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.79 In light of this conclusion, it did not consider the alternative 
arguments that the law breached Article 14 of the Protocol (non-discrimination), or Article 10 of 
the Protocol (freedom of expression).80 
III. Comparative Analysis of International Decisions 
 
The three recent international decisions on prisoner disenfranchisement are interesting 
both for their differences and their similarities.  This Part treats each in turn. 
a. Differences between the International Decisions 
 
Each of the international decisions distinguishes itself in certain regards.  First, the extent 
of prisoner disenfranchisement was different in each case:  The provision at issue in the ECHR 
case denied the vote to all convicted prisoners, irrespective of length of sentence and gravity of 
 
76 Hirst, supra note 63, at para. 9. 
77 Id. at paras. 10, 49. 
78 Id. at para. 51. 
79 Id. at para. 52. 
80 Id. at para. 53-56. 
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offense; the South African law denied the vote to convicted prisoners serving sentences of 
imprisonment without the option of a fine; the Canadian law denied the vote to prisoners serving 
sentences of two years or more.  Second, South Africa was the outlier when it comes to the 
justification advanced by the government for disenfranchisement.  Whereas the governments in 
the Canadian and European cases advanced the dual goals of preventing crime and enhancing 
civic responsibility,81 the South African government’s justification was markedly different, based 
on logistical and cost issues.82 Third, on the level of constitutional scrutiny, the ECHR 
distinguished itself from the South African and Canadian courts; whereas those latter courts 
struck down prisoner disenfranchisement based on a heightened constitutional review, the ECHR 
reached the same decision with what appears to be a more relaxed level of review.  Fourth, the 
cases differed in the attention they accorded to the jurisprudence of other countries in the area of 
prisoner disenfranchisement.  Whereas the majority decision of the Canadian Supreme Court did 
not use foreign or international sources at all, the other two courts conducted extensive 
investigations of the state of prisoner disenfranchisement beyond their jurisdiction, notably of the 
Canadian decision itself.  The South African Constitutional Court analyzed the Canadian decision 
for no less than seven pages; it was unquestionably informed by the decision, integrating 
language from the Canadian case into its very holding.83 The ECHR preferred to place this 
comparative material at the beginning of its judgment, excerpting lengthy passages from both the 
majority and dissenting opinions from Sauvé 2 before beginning its analysis.84 Fifth, the cases 
enjoyed differing levels of agreement among the justices.  The European decision was 
unanimous, likely a reflection of the broader level of disenfranchisement at issue.  The Canadian 
decision came to a 5-4 vote.  The South African decision enjoyed a majority of 9 votes to 2.  
 
81 The “preventing crime” goal differed slightly in the two cases:  In the European case, it was grounded in 
a deterrence rationale, whereas in the Canadian case it was based on a retributive rationale. 
82 This difference was noted by the majority in the South African case.  See NICRO, supra note 45, at para. 
65. 
83 NICRO, supra note 45, at paras. 58-67. 
84 Hirst, supra note 63, at paras. 25-27.  It also cites relevant provisions of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  Id. at paras. 22-23. 
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Finally, each court approached the constitutional test differently.  The ECHR did not rule on the 
legitimate ends question, finding that the disenfranchisement law failed the proportionality test.  
By contrast, the South African Constitutional Court determined the ends were not compelling 
(finding that accommodating the prison voters would not cause an undue resource burden) and 
thus did not even carry out the proportionality analysis.  Differing from both of these approaches, 
the Canadian Supreme Court, after presumptively accepting the government’s stated objectives, 
struck down the disenfranchisement law based on a lack of connection between the means and 
ends. 
b. Common Ground:  The Continuum of Applicability 
 
Perhaps more interesting and useful than the above differences are the similarities in the 
three cases, decided within differing legal and social settings on three different continents.  First, 
despite the geographic, social, and historical differences distinguishing the three jurisdictions, all 
three courts relied on a remarkably similar test of constitutional scrutiny.  In each case, a 
constitutional provision had to show an acceptable governmental objective, a connection had to 
exist between the stated objective and the means employed, and the means had to pass both a 
proportionality test and a minimum impairment test.  
Second, and more importantly, the cases all attempted to view the acceptability of 
prisoner disenfranchisement along a continuum.  On the far end of the spectrum, it was a forgone 
conclusion in each case that any continued disenfranchisement after release from prison would be 
unconstitutional.  Indeed, even all the dissenting opinions made this point clearly.85 Moving 
along the continuum, all three courts were clear that a blanket disenfranchisement of all prisoners 
which failed to account for the seriousness of their crime was unconstitutional.  The distinction 
between the two Canadian cases exhibits this quite clearly.  In the Sauvé 1 case, a unanimous 
 
85 NICRO, supra note 45, at para. 115-17 (dissenting opinion of Justice Madala in South African case); Id. 
at para. 151 (dissenting opinion of Justice Ngcobo in South African case); Sauvé 2, supra note 23, at para. 
71. 
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court held that a blanket disenfranchisement on all prisoners was an unconstitutional violation of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  In Sauvé 2, the Justices found a law 
disenfranchising prisoners serving a sentence of two years or more also violated the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but the margin was a much closer 5-4 vote.86 Taking these two 
cases together, it is clear that the Canadian Justices care very much about the length of sentence 
when considering the disenfranchisement issue.  There may well be some better place to draw the 
line, something longer than a two year sentence, where a majority of the Justices would agree that 
disenfranchisement is always appropriate.87 This is because the real question at issue in the 
Canadian context is not the length of sentence but the seriousness of the crime at stake, the former 
serving as a proxy for the latter.  This is clear from actions of the Canadian government in the 
period between the two cases, including a special governmental Commission (the Lortie 
Commission) which considered prisoner disenfranchisement in depth.  According to the Sauvé 2 
Court: 
[T]he Lortie Commission … concluded that prisoners who had been convicted of 
an offence punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment and who had been 
sentenced to a prison term of 10 years or more should be disqualified from voting 
for the duration of their incarceration. A Special Committee on Electoral Reform, 
which reviewed the Lortie Commission's Report, recommended, however, that a 
two-year cutoff was appropriate since this would catch "serious offenders". [The 
trial judge noted:] ‘The Special Committee spent a great deal of time trying to 
determine whether a two-year limit for the disqualification was appropriate, or 
whether a cutoff of five years, or seven years, or ten years (as recommended by 
the Lortie Commission) was more justifiable. Eventually, the Special Committee 
recommended a two-year cutoff since, in their view, serious offenders may be 
considered to be those individuals who have been sentenced to a term of two 
years or more in a correctional institution.’88 
The Conversation between the Lortie Commission and the Special Committee on 
Electoral Reform makes clear that the operative concern to be addressed in setting the minimum 
prison sentence resulting in disenfranchisement was an effort to ensure that disenfranchisement 
 
86 See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. 
87 Sauvé 2, supra note 23, at 162 (“[A]ny higher cutoff line, i.e. 5, 10, or 25 years of incarceration, would 
also, technically, be less intrusive.”). 
88 Id. at para. 164. 
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was limited to “serious offenders.”  It engaged in a detailed investigation of which cut-off point 
would most effectively catch these serious offenders without being over-inclusive.  This is a 
difficult inquiry, and differences of opinion developed between the Lortie Commission (10 years 
or more), the Special Committee on Electoral Reform (2 years or more), the majority in Sauvé 2 
(2 years is over-inclusive),89 and the dissent (give deference to the 2 year standard).90 Everyone 
agreed, however, on the concept of a continuum, and the importance of only catching “serious 
offenders” along that continuum.  Everyone agreed that disenfranchising offenders with sentences 
of less than two years would be over-inclusive. 
This continuum notion was also present in the ECHR decision, which seemed to test its 
position along the continuum by reference to the distinction between the two Sauvé decisions in 
Canada.  It emphasized that although, “as the [British] Government pointed out, the [Sauvé 2] 
decision was taken by five votes to four, it may be noted that this was in relation to a less 
restrictive bar imposed on prisoners (those sentenced to two years or more) and that in the first 
Sauvé case, concerning a blanket bar on all convicted prisoners, the decision was unanimous.  
Taking due account of the difference in text and structure of the Canadian Charter, the Court 
nonetheless finds that substance of the reasoning may be regarded as apposite in the present 
case.”91 Against this background, the ECHR unanimously condemned the blanket 
disenfranchisement at issue in the Hirst case. 
The South African Court was also aware of the continuum notion.  The legislation at 
issue in the South African case distinguished between three kinds of prisoners:  First, prisoners 
who were awaiting trial were allowed to vote because of a presumption of innocence.  Second, 
prisoners “sentenced to a fine with the alternative of imprisonment who were in custody because 
they had not paid the fine” were also allowed to vote based on the rationale that failure to pay the 
fine was likely due to poverty, an unacceptable basis for disenfranchisement.  Third, prisoners 
 
89 Sauvé 2, supra note 23, at para. 54. 
90 Id. at para. 163. 
91 Hirst, supra note 63, at para. 43. 
24
sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine were denied the right to vote.92 Although 
these three levels alone could be viewed as an inclusiveness continuum, the large (9-2) majority 
was unconvinced that such an approach could sufficiently solve the inclusiveness problem, 
arguing that disenfranchisement of the third class of prisoners sentenced to imprisonment without 
the option of a fine constituted “a blanket exclusion akin to that which failed to pass scrutiny in 
the first Sauvé case.”93 
Thus, in all three of the international decisions, the operative question was the 
seriousness of the offense for which disenfranchisement should result.  The more inclusive the 
disenfranchisement law, the more minor offenses it will catch and the less likely courts have been 
to find it acceptable.  Cases with blanket disenfranchisement laws received unanimous 
condemnation by the courts in question, whereas laws limited to a smaller, more serious set of 
offenses left those courts much more divided.  This approach differs markedly from the recent 
cases in U.S. Circuit courts challenging felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act.94 
Whereas the VRA approach focuses on the discriminatory effects of felon disenfranchisement, all 
three of the international tribunals explicitly passed up a discrimination or equality-based 
inquiry.95 While the VRA approach of the Circuit Courts adds an important front against felon 
disenfranchisement in the U.S., the international decisions raise the idea that another, more 
inherent criticism of felon disenfranchisement should not be forgotten.  The time has come to 
revisit whether Ramirez’s holding is – or should be – so broad as to extend to all crimes a state 
chooses to put in its felon disenfranchisement statute. 
 
92 NICRO, supra note 45, at para. 43. 
93 Id. at para. 67 (noting that the Government “mentions crimes involving violence or even theft, but the 
legislation is not tailored to such crimes.  Its target is every prisoner sentenced to imprisonment without the 
option of a fine.  We have no information about the sort of offences fro which shorter periods of 
imprisonment are likely to by imposed, the sort of persons who are likely to be imprisoned for such 
offences, and the number of persons who might lose their vote because of comparatively minor 
transgressions.”). 
94 See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. 
95 See supra notes 36, 57, 80, and accompanying text. 
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IV. The Transnational Judicial Discourse  
 
a. The US Supreme Court and Transnational Judicial 
Discourse 
 
This article uses the term “transnational judicial discourse” to describe the use by one 
constitutional court of case law of another constitutional court in the course of domestic 
constitutional interpretation.  This is a much narrower and newer question than the issue of the 
relevance of international law in a given domestic system.  This latter issue, in the U.S., is as old 
as the Constitution itself,96 and implicates many complex subsidiary issues, such as the extent to 
which customary international law applies in domestic courts,97 issues connected to the status of a 
treaty as either self-executing or non-self-executing,98 the Charming Betsy cannon,99 the last in 
time rule for conflicts between treaties and statutes,100 and the relationship between the 
Congressional treaty power and American federalism.101 None of these issues come in to play in 
the comparatively less contentious notion of a transnational judicial discourse, because the 
foreign law decisions at issue in the transnational judicial discourse cannot bind the domestic 
constitutional court that is considering them.  Rather, the constitutional court is merely engaging 
in some comparative law before getting down to the job of domestic constitutional interpretation.   
 
96 See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must 
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of 
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”).   
97 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The United States Constitution and International Law:  International 
Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism:  Reflections on the Customary International Law 
Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 91 (2004); Kathleen M. Kedian, Customary International Law and 
International Human Rights Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of The Paquete 
Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV 1395 (1999).  
98 See, e.g., Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical 
Analysis, 26 VA J. INT'L L. 627 (1986); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760 
(1988).  
99 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) (holding that “an act of congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains.”). 
100 See RESTATEMENT 3D OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987). 
101 See Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, Of Federalism, Human Rights, and the Holland Caveat:  
Congressional Power to Implement Treaties, 25 MICH. J. INTL. L. 265, 309-32 (2004). 
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Constitutional courts worldwide are increasingly adopting this transnational judicial 
discourse.102 The US Supreme Court is no exception, as was first evident in Lawrence v. Texas, 
citing jurisprudence of European Court of Human Rights in holding that same-sex couples have a 
constitutional right to privacy.103 In Roper v. Simmons, decided last spring, the Supreme Court 
engaged comparative law even more actively.  In holding unconstitutional the application of 
capital punishment in cases where the offender was under age eighteen at the time of the crime, 
the Court cited several treaty provisions not binding on the U.S.; jurisprudence in Canada, 
Britain, India, and the European Court of Human Rights; and amicus briefs from the European 
Union and the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales.104 These cases are no 
accident or historical blip; in fact, six of the nine current justices have individually endorsed the 
transnational judicial discourse in other opinions, dissents, speeches, or articles.105 United States 
 
102 Cody Moon, Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the United States Supreme Court Join the 
Dialogue? 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 229 (2003). 
103 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981); 
P. G. & J. H. v United Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, ¶56 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 25, 2001); Modinos v 
Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1993); Norris v Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1988)). 
104 Roper v. Simmons, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 2200, at pp. 44-48 (Mar. 1, 2005) (citing, in addition to state 
practice in numerous countries, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 37, Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U. N. T. S. 3, 28 I. L. M. 1448, 1468-1470 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 6(5), 999 U. N. T. S., at 175 (prohibiting capital punishment 
for anyone under 18 at the time of offense) (signed and ratified by the United States subject to a reservation 
regarding Article 6(5), as noted, supra, at 13); American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, 
Costa Rica, Art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U. N. T. S. 146 (entered into force July 19, 1978) (stating same 
prohibition); African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, Art. 5(3), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/ 
24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999) (stating same prohibition)). 
105 Moon, supra note 102, at 240-41) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 785-86 (1997) 
(Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment of the Court, discusses the approach taken to assisted suicide in 
the Netherlands); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (Justice Stevens, announcing the 
judgment of the Court, notes the relevance of international views on the death penalty); Printz, supra note 
108, at 976-77 (Justice Breyer advocating for transnational judicial dialogue in dissent); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg & Deborah Hones Merritt, Fifty-first Cardozo Memorial Lecture: Affirmative Action: An 
International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 253, 282 (1999) (emphasizing that comparative 
analysis is "emphatically ... relevant to the task of interpreting constitutions"); Sandra Day O'Connor, 
Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 1997 
Spring meeting, American College of Trial Lawyers, reprinted in 4 Int'l Judicial Observer, June 1997 at 2 
("I think that I, and the other Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, will find ourselves looking more 
frequently to the decisions of other constitutional courts. Some, like the German and Italian courts, have 
been working since the last world war. They have struggled with the same basic constitutional questions 
that we have: equal protection, due process, the rule of law in constitutional democracies. Others, like the 
South African court, are relative newcomers on the scene but have already entrenched themselves as 
guarantors of civil rights. All these courts have something to teach us about the civilizing functions of 
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Supreme Court justices are also meeting with their foreign colleagues – from national 
constitutional courts and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – with increasing regularity.  
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has led Supreme Court delegations to meet with their counterparts 
in France, Germany and England. There have also been two official meetings between the United 
States Supreme Court and the ECJ, one in 1998 in Brussels and another in 2000 in Washington.106 
In a very telling move, Chief Justice Rehnquist recently created a branch of the federal judiciary 
exclusively dealing with foreign policy issues, to "coordinate the federal judiciary's relationship 
with foreign judiciaries and with official and unofficial agencies and organizations interested in 
international judicial relations and the establishment and expansion of the rule of law and 
administration of justice."107
Despite these events, the transnational judicial discourse remains controversial, and the 
doubters on the court are equally vocal as the supporters.  Chief among these doubters is Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who is firm in his resolve that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task 
of interpreting a constitution.”108 Justice Scalia’s view represents the concept of legal 
particularism, the belief that   
legal norms and institutions generally, and constitutions in particular, both 
emerge from and reflect particular national circumstances, most centrally a 
nation's history and political culture. In its strongest formulation, legal 
particularism asserts that constitutions are important aspects of national identity. 
Comparative jurisprudence is of no assistance at all, precisely because it comes 
from outside a given legal system. At best, it represents a foreign curiosity of 
 
constitutional law.”); William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts: Comparative Remarks, in Germany and its 
Basic Law: Past, Present and Future, A German-American Symposium 411, 412 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald 
P. Kommers eds., 1993) (“[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly ground in so many countries, it is time 
that the United States courts begin looking to the decision of other constitutional courts to aid in their own 
deliberative process.”)). 
106 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1120 (2000). 
107 Id. at 1122-23 (citing Chief Judge Michael M. Mihm, International Judicial Relations Committee 
Promotes Communication, Coordination, 1 INT'L JUD. OBSERVER 1 (Federal Judicial Center & American 
Society of International Law, Washington, D.C.) (Sept. 1995)). 
108 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997).  There are also doubters in the academic 
community.  See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 58 (2004) ("Using global opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation 
dramatically undermines sovereignty . . . ."). 
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strictly academic interest and little practical relevance. At worst, its use is a 
foreign imposition or even a form of legal imperialism.109
According to the legal particularists, the transnational judicial discourse is at its best 
irrelevant, and at its worst represents a dangerous threat of legal imperialism.  Answering this 
heavy critique requires taking a closer look at the process of transnational judicial discourse itself.   
Sujit Choudhry has identified three different ways that courts use comparative 
jurisprudence:  universalist interpretation, genealogical interpretation, and dialogical 
interpretation.110 On the one extreme, the universalist interpretation directly contradicts legal 
particularism, premised on the belief that constitutional guarantees are transcendent, universal 
concepts and that “all constitutional courts are engaged in the identification, interpretation, and 
application of the same set of norms.”111 This is the slippery slope that legal particularists fear, 
but this type of transnational judicial discourse is not even contemplated by any of the members 
of the US Supreme Court.  Occupying a middle ground, genealogical interpretation justifies 
importation and application of foreign constitutional doctrines because of a proven historical link 
between the two constitutions that is so strong as to properly be considered “genealogical.”112 
Although this method has been used by the Canadian Supreme Court to justify the use of 
American constitutional doctrine on the status and land rights of Indian nations,113 its use has 
never been suggested by any of the members of the United States Supreme Court.   
Finally, the least controversial form of transnational judicial discourse is dialogical 
interpretation.  As the name suggests, this process is nothing more than a “dialogue” a court 
engages in with the other jurisprudence, respecting the constitutional boundaries so important to 
the legal particularists.  This non-binding dialogue can help “courts identify the normative and 
 
109 Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 830 (1999). 
110 Id. at  825. 
111 Choudhry, supra note 109, at 825. 
112 According to this school, a genealogical link is present only when one constitutional order is born from 
another. Choudhry, supra note 109, at 838. 
113 Id. at 866-85. 
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factual assumptions underlying their own constitutional jurisprudence by engaging with 
comparable jurisprudence of other jurisdictions.”114 Whether the constitutional traditions at issue 
are very similar or strikingly different is irrelevant to the dialogical approach, which operates 
only as ‘food for thought’ before the court begins the real job of domestic constitutional 
interpretation.  It is this form – and only this form – of transnational judicial discourse that is 
increasingly applied in the US Supreme Court. 
 In the recent debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer on the relevance of foreign 
court decisions to US Constitutional interpretation,115 Justice Breyer firmly adopted this 
dialogical approach.  He argued that considering foreign decisions when similar issues arise in 
domestic and foreign cases could only benefit the Court because it is making use of the foreign 
brain power of many constitutional court judges to flesh out all of the issues without having to be 
bound by the results they reach.  This answers the two chief critiques of the legal particularists.  
First, the potential to flesh out issues could be quite valuable, answering the legal particularist’s 
irrelevance concern.  Second, the non-binding nature of this exercise answers the legal 
particularist’s ‘legal imperialism’ concern.  The Court is free to take any ideas the foreign court 
discussed and then treat them in its own way, using domestic constitutional tests. 
b. The Transnational Judicial Discourse and Felon 
Disenfranchisement 
 
The previous section establishes that a majority of the Supreme Court is willing to engage 
in the transnational judicial discourse, and that this discourse would be of the least invasive 
dialogical form.  If the judges are willing to engage in such discourses, prisoner 
disenfranchisement presents an ideal area to do so because of similarities of circumstances and 
 
114 Id. at 825. 
115 Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Stephen Breyer, American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), online at 
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4
757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument (last accessed February 28, 2005). 
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constitutional tests involved.  It is thus worth revisiting the conclusions drawn in Part III with an 
eye towards ways the U.S. Supreme Court might benefit from the various analyses undertaken.   
As discussed supra Part III(b), the over-arching theme shared by the decisions in Canada, 
South Africa, and the ECHR is that prisoner disenfranchisement exists along a continuum of 
acceptability with seriousness of the crime committed as the most prominent variable.  Thus, 
while unanimous courts in Europe and Canada found a blanket disenfranchisement unacceptable 
because it punished even non-serious offenders, the Canadian Supreme Court split 5-4 on a 
disenfranchisement law that only affected prisoners convicted of more serious crimes for which 
the sentence was two years or greater.  Similarly, the Lortie Commission in Canada had the stated 
goal of disenfranchising only “serious” offenders.116 The transnational judicial discourse thus 
suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court consider whether the seriousness of the crime can or should 
play a more active role in the legal discourse on felon disenfranchisement.   
This is not to suggest that “seriousness” has the same meaning from one legal system to 
the next.  Indeed, in the three different countries studied, three different proxies for seriousness 
emerge.  For example, in South Africa, the legislature had determined that all crimes for which 
the penalty is a sentence of imprisonment without the option of a fine are necessarily serious 
enough to trigger disenfranchisement. In Canada, on the other hand, the legislature determined 
that all sentences of two years or more are necessarily for crimes serious enough to trigger 
disenfranchisement.  Because of different sentencing practices and different applications of 
criminological theory, neither of these proxies for seriousness will necessarily be appropriate in 
the United States.  But this does not matter in the dialogical transnational judicial discourse.  All 
that matters is the concept, that legislatures are likely to view certain crimes as stronger 
candidates for disenfranchisement than other crimes.  Perhaps in the U.S. those crimes have 
unique substantive characteristics compared with the serious criteria identified in other countries.  
There is no need to adopt the identical concept, because the dialogical transnational discourse 
 
116 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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only uses the idea of a continuum, not its precise framework.  Adopting no more than this idea, 
the next Part critically reconsiders the framers’ original intent in drafting the constitutional 
provision that has become crucial to the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement, section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
V. A Return to the U.S. Discourse on Felon 
Disenfranchisement 
 
After having established above that prisoner disenfranchisement in other jurisdictions 
exists along a continuum of applicability based on the offense committed, this Part will consider 
this question in the domestic context on two distinct levels.  First, it will reconsider the Supreme 
Court’s seminal decision in Richardson v. Ramirez with an eye to this continuum idea.   
Employing the continuum notion functionally, this Part will question the understanding that the 
words “or other crime” in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment were meant to affirmatively 
sanction disenfranchisement for a broad range of crimes with little regard to seriousness or 
substance of the crime itself.   It will answer this question by a review of legislative history of the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, showing that the crimes contemplated by the Framers 
were only those existing in a very particularized, narrow section of the overall continuum of 
crimes.  Thus, although the question comes from the continuum notion developed from foreign 
materials, the answer comes wholly from a domestic source, the legislative history of the 
Framers.  Second, the Part then considers the notion of a continuum substantively, envisioning 
what a U.S. Continuum of applicability of felon disenfranchisement would look like without the 
affirmative sanction now believed to exist in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
a. A Functional Use of the Continuum:  Returning to 
Ramirez 
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Ever since Richardson v. Ramirez, the constitutional posture of felon disenfranchisement 
in the United States has differed markedly from other “first generation” voting rights issues.  
Whereas the Supreme Court’s seminal cases concerning the denial of the vote based on 
education,117 property,118 and wealth119 involved the classic ends-means constitutional scrutiny we 
have come to expect from equal protection decisions, Richardson relied on a decidedly different, 
textual, argument. This textual argument focused on § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
provision concerning apportionment of congressional representation:  
[W]hen the right to vote ... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way 
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of 
age in such state.120 
Based on this language, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution thus provided an 
“affirmative sanction” for felon disenfranchisement, foreclosing the need for an equal protection 
inquiry.121 In so doing, the Supreme Court closed the door to any form of means-ends equal 
protection scrutiny, resting its decision wholly, and delicately, on the three words “or other 
crime.”  It did not consider the seriousness of the crime leading to disenfranchisement in any 
level of detail.   
The Ramirez majority’s reliance on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
constraint on Section 1 is open to question.  As Marshall persuasively argued in dissent, the 
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is quite clear that Section 2 “was not intended 
and should not be construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the Fourteenth 
 
117 Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (upholding literacy tests as a requirement 
for the franchise). 
118 Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (striking down a law on equal protection 
grounds which denied the right to vote in school board elections to persons living in the voting area who 
did not own property there nor have children in the school system). 
119 Harper v. Virginia Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating the poll tax as a requirement for 
voting in state and local elections). 
120 Ramirez, supra note 1, at 42-43 (citing U.S. CONSTITUTION ART. 14, SEC. 2) (emphasis by Supreme 
Court). 
121 Id. at 54. 
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Amendment.”122 Rather, it was included to provide a “special remedy -- reduced representation -- 
to cure a particular form of electoral abuse -- the disenfranchisement of Negroes.  There is no 
indication that the framers of the provisions intended that special penalty to be the exclusive 
remedy for all forms of electoral discrimination.”123 Although scholars after Ramirez have 
continued to make this point persuasively,124 it is problematic in that it amounts to re-litigating 
Ramirez all over again on the exact argument the majority already considered and rejected.    
Even with new members on the Court, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would overrule 
its former precedent without some changed circumstances or new argument; this is all the more 
true since the Ramirez argument is a textual one based on the intent of the framers, not something 
potentially subject to an evolving interpretation.125
Rather than attempting re-litigate Ramirez on the same arguments that failed the first time 
around – however strong those arguments may appear – it is time for commentators and courts 
alike to broaden their inquiry.  It is at just this brainstorming stage when a dialogical comparative 
law analysis can be the most useful:  By looking to similar litigation abroad, we can gain ideas 
potentially testable in the domestic setting.  This proves true in the present case:  This article’s 
comparative law analysis has shown that international decisions on prisoner disenfranchisement 
focus on the nature of the crime when subjecting the practice to constitutional scrutiny, making 
this a central element of their proportionality analysis.  It has, in fact, been so central to the 
analyses of the international courts that they chose to forego equality and discrimination analysis 
 
122 Id. at 74 (citing Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 108, 109 (1960); H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 98, 126 (1908); B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTION 290-291 (1914); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 185 (1956); 
Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-ninth 
Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 44 (1965)). 
123 Id. 
124 See, e.g., David Shapiro, Mr. Justice  Rehnquist:  A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 303 
(1976) (arguing that “there is not a word in the fourteenth amendment suggesting that the exemptions in 
section two’s formula are in any way a barrier to the judicial application of section one in voting rights 
cases, whether or not they involve the rights of ex-convicts.”). 
125 Compare the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which is not based on a static textual 
reference but rather on the “evolving standard of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). 
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altogether.126 Without adopting any of those courts’ conclusions or legal tests (the fear of the 
legal particularists), an approach emphasizing a dialogical transnational judicial discourse merely 
adopts the idea of considering the nature of the crime in interpreting the Constitution’s textual 
reference.  It then proceeds to traditional methods of constitutional interpretation, in this case an 
examination of the discussions of the Framers to attempt to uncover exactly what sorts of crimes 
they meant when they wrote the words “or other crime.” 
This textual approach is true to the original reasoning of Ramirez, because it accepts that 
the explicit mention of “crime” in Section 2 places a limit on the equal protection analysis of 
felon disenfranchisement under Section 1.  Rather than taking issue with the linkage between 
Section 1 and Section 2 like the Ramirez dissent, it relies on this linkage like the Ramirez 
majority.  It then shifts the focus to developing a more nuanced understanding of just what the 
Framers meant by “other crime” in Section 2.    
b. Re-Examining the Legislative History 
 
It is generally accepted that we know nothing about the Framer’s original intent in 
writing the crucial words “or other crime” in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In this 
light, both the majority127 and the dissent128 in Ramirez comment that very little legislative history 
exists as to this phrase.  Agreeing with the majority on the lack of legislative history, Justice 
Marshall notes in dissent that “the proposed §  2 went to a joint committee containing only the 
phrase ‘participation in rebellion’ and emerged with ‘or other crime’ inexplicably tacked on.”129 
The only cited basis for this understanding of the legislative history, however, is a footnote in a 
 
126 See supra notes 36, 57, 80, and accompanying text. 
127 Ramirez, supra note 1, at 43 (“The legislative history bearing on the meaning of the relevant language of 
§ 2 is scant indeed; the framers of the Amendment were primarily concerned with the effect of reduced 
representation upon the States, rather than with the two forms of disenfranchisement which were exempted 
from that consequence by the language with which we are concerned here.”). 
128 Id. at 72-73. 
129 Id. at 73. 
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law review note published the preceding year,130 but that law review note’s analysis of the 
legislative history is incorrect. In that note, Howard Itzkowitz and Lauren Oldak stated that the 
proposed Section 2 began as House Resolution 51, and “was sent to a Joint Committee with the 
phrase ‘participation in rebellion,’ [but without the words “or other crime”].”131 According to 
Itzkowitz and Oldak’s version of events, it was not until the bill re-emerged from Committee as 
House Resolution 127 six weeks later that the words “or other crime” first appeared.132 A careful 
reading of the legislative history, however, shows that several different versions of House 
Resolution 51 were printed for further consideration in committee,133 including one specifically 
invoking the word “crime.”134
On March 12, 1866, Senator Grimes’ proposed version of House Resolution 51 contained 
an exceptions clause worded “except for crime or disloyalty.”135 Thus, contrary to conventional 
understanding, the key word “crime” was proposed before H.R. 51 ever went to the “black box” 
of the Joint Committee.  This is significant because the whole text of the plenary discussions has 
been preserved, and it is thus possible to fully investigate what Senator Grimes was reaching for 
in proposing this precise language.  In this regard, Grimes stated that he had “taken it from a 
proposition submitted by a distinguished Representative from the House of Representatives, Mr. 
Broomall.”136 An examination of Representative Broomall’s earlier interventions leaves 
absolutely no room for doubt that Mr. Broomall understood the word “crime” in this context to 
refer to crimes of disloyalty related to the recent rebellion.  He stated:   
By the doctrine laid down by all the writers upon public law, … [the victor in 
civil war] may treat its opponents either as citizens or public enemies, may hang 
for treason or hold as prisoners of war. … The question of citizenship of its 
opponents is for it to decide.  If I am right in all this, then it is for the 
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133 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1289, 1321 (1866). 
134 Id. at 1320-21. 
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Government to elect whether or not it will hereafter treat the rebels as citizens or 
banish them as alien enemies.  …  A question might naturally arise whether we 
ought again to trust those who have once betrayed us. … Yet the spirit of 
forgiveness is so inherent in the American bosom that no party in the country 
proposes to withhold from these people the advantages of citizenship.  …  Some 
public legislative act is necessary to show the world that those who have forfeited 
all claims upon the Government … are to be welcomed back as the prodigal son 
whenever they are ready to return as the prodigal son.  The act under 
consideration … embrace[s] the late rebels, and it gives them the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United States, though it does not 
propose to exempt them from punishment for their past crimes.137 
Read in context, it is clear that the “past crimes” to which Broomall refers are crimes of 
rebellion, in particular treason. Without mentioning any other crimes, Broomall makes specific 
mention to treason on five more occasions in his speech138 before concluding with this language:    
“All parties agree that the people of these States, being thus disorganized for all State purposes, 
are still, at the election of the Government, citizens of the United States, and as such, as far as 
they have not been disqualified by treason, ought to be allowed to form their own State 
governments.”139 
After Senator Grimes’ proposal for H.R. 51, incorporating Broomall’s “crimes” language, 
Senator Wilson and Senator Sumner each individually submitted competing proposals with 
 
137 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1263 (1866) (emphasis added).  But note:  Although this prior 
intervention of Broomall is very representative of his understanding of the word “crime” in the context and 
occurred during the period that Senator Grimes referred to the contribution of Representative Broomall, 
Grimes may have been principally referring to a prior proposition of Broomall which does not in itself 
contain an exceptions clause.  ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ 
DEBATES 120 (1967) (“Whenever The elective franchise shall be denied by the constitution or laws of 
any State to any proportion of its male citizens over the age of twenty-one years, the same proportion of its 
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of discrimination such as literacy tests and poll taxes.  By adopting Broomall’s wording eliminating direct 
mention of race and by explicitly referring to “crime,” Grimes has incorporated both of Broomall’s 
interventions.  
138 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1263 (1866) (“[W]herever my Government owes me no protection I 
owe it no allegiance and can commit no treason.”); Id (“They will not say that we have a Government for 
the purpose of alleigiance and for the punishment of treason.”); Id. (“They know that there loyalty is the 
crime and treason the virtue.”); Id. at 1264 (“[T]raders [pride] themselves on their treason.”); Id. (arguing 
that complete trust in the Southern Senators and Representatives would “require as unquestioning a faith as 
to believe in the sudden conversion of whole communities from treason to loyalty.”). 
139 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1264 (1866) (emphasis added). 
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exclusion clauses limited to rebellion.140 All of these proposals were ordered to be printed for 
consideration in committee.  With these three proposals on the table, it is entirely feasible that the 
committee’s final wording “rebellion or other crime” was an attempt to combine them.  Thus, 
although Itzkowitz and Oldak were wrong in some of the specifics in their Note relied on by the 
Ramirez court, they are completely correct that “the thrust of [the Art. 2] language was to limit 
governmental activity by former rebels.”141 
In summary, modern analyses of the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
such as that carried out by the Ramirez court, fail to dig deep enough.  Faced with the phrase 
“rebellion or other crime,” they are quick to conclude that the disjunctive phrase signifies 
opposition between acts constituting rebellion and acts constituting the other crimes.  Read in 
context of the legislative discussions taking place at the time, it becomes clear that this is not the 
case.  The Fourteenth Amendment was drafted after an unforgettable rebellion of the highest 
magnitude.  In the context in which it was drafted, it seemed hardly necessary to define “crime” 
any further.  As the excerpted portion of Representative Broomall’s intervention makes clear, the 
“other crime” at issue in addition to rebellion was treason.  The phrase “rebellion or other crime” 
should be interpreted in the proper historical light to mean what the Framers intended:  “rebellion 
or other crime of disloyalty.”  Thus, the continuum notion has relevance in the domestic setting, 
because the Framers were considering only a very specific set of crimes when they drafted the 
exceptions clause in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
c. Means-End Constitutional Scrutiny:  A First Attempt 
 
By a close examination of the legislative history read in its proper context, we thus 
emerge from the original textual premise of Ramirez.  Properly contextualized, the reference to 
“crime” in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a narrow exception for rebellion and 
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treason, not a show-stopping affirmative sanction of general felon disenfranchisement.  The 
question of felon disenfranchisement should therefore be treated like other first-generation voting 
rights issues, subject to means-ends equal protection scrutiny.   Fortunately, we already have 
guidance on what this analysis would look like, because Justice Marshall reached the 
constitutional scrutiny analysis in his Ramirez dissent after dismissing the majority’s section 2 
textual argument on the basis that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment related to the specific 
issue of representative apportionment and was not meant to control section 1.142
In his equal protection analysis, Justice Marshall relied on the large jurisprudence of 
voting rights cases establishing voting as a fundamental right.143 Reasoning that this case 
presented a similar limitation on the franchise, he concluded that strict scrutiny was the 
appropriate standard of review.144 Marshall noted that the State put forth two state interests:  
preventing voter fraud and preventing felons from voting as a group to “repeal or emasculate 
provisions of the criminal code.”145 Marshall quickly dispersed with the latter interest, noting that 
the Court had “explicitly held that … ‘differences of opinion cannot justify excluding [any] group 
from . . . the franchise.’”146 As to the first interest of preventing voter fraud, Marshall noted that 
felon disenfranchisement was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive to meet this end.  Felon 
disenfranchisement was over-inclusive because it “is not limited to those who have demonstrated 
a marked propensity for abusing the ballot by violating election laws.  Rather, it encompasses all 
former felons and there has been no showing that ex-felons generally are any more likely to abuse 
the ballot than the remainder of the population.”147 It was under-inclusive because “many of 
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those convicted of violating election laws are treated as misdemeanants and are not barred from 
voting at all.”148 
Finding neither of the proposed interests persuasive, Marshall concluded that “the State 
has not met its burden of justifying the blanket disenfranchisement of former felons presented by 
this case.”149 
d. Looking Ahead:  A Broader Examination of the 
Continuum 
 
This Part began with a procedural application of the continuum of applicability concept.  
Having established the presence of a continuum internationally, it applied the idea of a continuum 
domestically by questioning whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment meant the words 
“or other crime” to sweep as broadly as they have been interpreted.  By examining the original 
legislative history of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Part has answered that 
question in the negative.  This final section now considers an altogether different application of 
the continuum; whereas the original application was procedural, giving reason to reconsider the 
meaning of a textual reference, this application is substantive, attempting to envision, based on 
the new information uncovered in the legislative history, what a continuum of applicability of 
felon disenfranchisement would look like.   
Envisioning such a continuum of applicability for felon disenfranchisement is a difficult 
task.  Because of the Supreme Court’s original textual mistake in Ramirez, discussed above, the 
continuum which can be distilled from the current case law is based on rational basis, not strict 
scrutiny.  In an article comparing disenfranchisement and employment discrimination of former 
felons,150 Elena Saxonhouse outlines the existing continuum under this rational basis approach.  
First, the Supreme Court has held that felon disenfranchisement laws passed with racially 
 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 78. 
150 Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection: Comparing Former Felons' Challenges to 
Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2004). 
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discriminatory intent will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.151 Second, a lower court has held 
that "no rational basis [exists] to preclude the registration of [former felons] who were 
incarcerated within the last five years and who had not registered previously, when those who 
were legally registered prior to incarceration may vote upon their release.”152 Third, a federal 
district court has held that Section 2's affirmative sanction of felon disenfranchisement is 
inapplicable to misdemeanants.153 Fourth, a district court has held that a state may not 
"haphazardly pick and choose" disqualifying crimes.154 Fifth, a district court has held that felon 
disenfranchisement laws may not discriminate based on sex.155
Thus, even under rational basis scrutiny, a continuum of applicability of felon 
disenfranchisement has begun to emerge in the United States.  First, disenfranchisement statutes 
passed with racially discriminatory intent are definitely unconstitutional.  Second, 
disenfranchisement statutes which blatantly discriminate based on other factors, such as sex, are 
also suspect.  Third, disenfranchisement for misdemeanors is highly questionable under any 
reading of the legislative history of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and reconstruction 
acts.156 
151 Underwood, supra note 2. 
152 Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442, 451 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). 
153 McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954, 974-76 (S.D. Miss. 1995). 
154 Allen v. Ellisor, 477 F. Supp. 321, 324 (D.S.C. 1979), rev'd, Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 
1981), vacated by 454 U.S. 807 (1981). 
155 Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 367 (N.D. Ala. 1977). 
156 In addition to the conclusive evidence that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to limit 
disenfranchisement to crimes of rebellion and treason, discussed above, several of the framers expressed 
their desire to limit disenfranchisement to infamous or heinous crimes.  For example, Senator Johnson of 
Maryland spoke only of “those who may have committed crimes of the most heinous character.”  Ramirez, 
supra note 1, at 47. (emphasis added).  Johnson included on this list “[m]urderers, robbers, houseburners, 
counterfeiters of the public securities of the United States.”  Id. Similarly, the majority in Ramirez noted 
that at the time of the adoption of the fourteenth Amendment, 29 States disenfranchised persons convicted 
of infamous crimes.  Id. at 48.  It seems highly doubtful that a misdemeanor could be considered 
“infamous” or “heinous.”  Similarly, disenfranchisement in the Reconstruction Acts, passed by the same 
Congress as the Fourteenth Amendment, was limited to “felonies at common law.”  See, e.g., 
Reconstruction Act.  Act of Mar. 2, 1867, c. 153, Sect. 5, 14 Stat. 428 (cited in Ramirez, supra, at 49). 
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Importantly, however, this continuum is based on holdings premised on the belief that 
Ramirez allows for, at most, rational basis scrutiny of felon disenfranchisement.157 As this article 
has argued,158 the legislative history of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
misinterpreted by the Ramirez court and that section thus should not operate as a barrier to the 
Court’s traditional strict scrutiny for voting as a fundamental right.  In this light, the continuum of 
applicability would likely shift significantly.  Because Justice Marshall adopted strict scrutiny in 
his Ramirez dissent, his contribution again becomes significant.  Applying strict scrutiny, 
Marshall adopts a continuum of acceptability in which certain serious crimes or voting-specific 
crimes could justify disenfranchisement, but other crimes could not.159 As Marshall wrote: 
To say that §  2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a direct limitation on the 
protection afforded voting rights by §  1 leads to absurd results.  If one accepts 
the premise that §  2 authorizes disenfranchisement for any crime, the challenged 
California provision could, as the California Supreme Court has observed, 
require disenfranchisement for seduction under promise of marriage, or 
conspiracy to operate a motor vehicle without a muffler.  Disenfranchisement 
extends to convictions for vagrancy in Alabama or breaking a water pipe in 
North Dakota, to note but two examples.  Even a jaywalking or traffic conviction 
could conceivably lead to disenfranchisement, since §  2 does not differentiate 
between felonies and misdemeanors.160 
Consistent with all the international decisions’ majorities and dissents,161 Marshall 
concludes that disenfranchisement of former felons who have completely served their sentence is 
unjustifiable.162 It is important for legal particularists to note that Marshall reached this decision 
decades before the international decisions discussed in this article, and he reached it solely on the 
basis of traditional U.S. Constitutional interpretation.  Claims of “legal imperialism” in the 
context of the transnational judicial discourse are difficult to sustain in light of the fact that 
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Marshall’s equal protection analysis came out almost identical to the international decisions, 
decades before those opinions were even written.     
Ultimately, a continuum of applicability of felon disenfranchisement will be for the 
courts to define on a case by case basis, once the current textual road-block gives way to a 
nuanced constitutional balancing process.  But, we can begin to speculate.  First, Underwood 
would still stand at the far end of the continuum, barring any disenfranchisement statute passed 
with racially discriminatory intent.  Second, the disenfranchisement of former felons would be 
extremely difficult to justify when the absence of any textual “affirmative sanction” for felon 
disenfranchisement is combined with a strict scrutiny approach.  But, whereas Justice Marshall in 
Ramirez believed all former felons should be re-enfranchised under strict scrutiny, my reading of 
the legislative history would still affirmatively sanction disenfranchisement of former felons who 
had committed one of a narrow set of crimes related to rebellion, such as treason.  Third, under a 
strict scrutiny test, the somewhat controversial decisions of the lower courts discussed by 
Saxonhouse are likely to find much more widespread acceptance.  For example, the decision of 
the Southern District of Mississippi not to disenfranchise misdemeanants163 looks quite 
uncontroversial under strict scrutiny, because the punishment is not narrowly tailored to the 
crime.  But, these cases all fall relatively far to one side of the continuum.  If the courts re-
examine the intention of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and debunk the affirmative 
sanction currently supporting felon disenfranchisement, the most difficult and important question 
they will face is for what crimes the practice is justifiable under narrow tailoring and 
proportionality analysis.  They may conclude that the franchise, as a “fundamental political right 
… preservative of all rights,”164 always comes out on top in proportionality analysis, except for 
crimes of rebellion such as treason.  On the other hand, they could plausibly conclude that certain 
 
163 See supra note 153. 
164 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
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crimes related to voting or crimes involving a high degree of moral turpitude are serious enough 
to satisfy proportionality and related closely enough to voting to satisfy narrow tailoring. 
In conclusion, even with the textual understanding that section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment affirmatively sanctions felon disenfranchisement, a continuum of applicability of the 
practice has begun to develop in the lower courts.  If courts would accept the argument presented 
in this article, limiting the affirmative textual sanction to crimes of rebellion such as treason, the 
continuum of applicability would both strengthen and shift.  The continuum would strengthen 
because rather than relying on a supposed textual sanction, courts would confront the issue and 
test the appropriateness of felon disenfranchisement in light of all the potential challenges to the 
practice that come on to their docket.  The continuum would shift because strict scrutiny would 
provide a much more stringent paradigm within which to justify felon disenfranchisement.  Under 
such a paradigm, the side of the continuum allowing felon disenfranchisement would likely be 
limited to three narrow areas.  First, disenfranchisement for crimes involving rebellion or treason 
would be affirmatively sanctioned by the text of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Second, by a similar rationale, disenfranchisement for crimes involving disloyalty in voting may 
be legitimate.  Finally, disenfranchisement for crimes involving an extremely high level of moral 
turpitude may (or may not) prove serious enough to satisfy proportionality.  
VI. Conclusion 
 
After years of dormancy, the debate over felon disenfranchisement in the U.S. is alive 
again under the rubric of the Voting Rights Act.  Although the Voting Rights Act represents a 
valuable tool for those attempting to challenge felon disenfranchisement laws, this article 
questions whether it should be the only tool.  Limiting judicial challenges of felon 
disenfranchisement to Section 2 the VRA suggests that it is only discriminatory outcomes which 
make felon disenfranchisement problematic, not the potentially inherent injustice of the practice.   
Since the Supreme Court held in Ramirez three decades ago that the Constitution affirmatively 
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sanctioned felon disenfranchisement, however, there has seemed little hope of resurrecting a 
constitutional argument as to the inherently problematic nature of the practice.   Comparative law 
provides an idea to suggest this original textual premise be re-examined.  In all three of the recent 
international cases discussed in this article, the courts placed a heavy emphasis on viewing 
prisoner disenfranchisement along a continuum of acceptability with the nature of the offense as 
the major variable.  With this idea in mind, this article has examined the original intent of the 
Framers to determine if the phrase “or other crime” was as broad as the Ramirez Court interpreted 
it.  Comparative law operates in this dialogical way not to import a foreign test or doctrine, but 
rather to generate an idea which is then tested using conventional domestic tools of Constitutional 
interpretation.  Interestingly, it appears that, like the international context, the Framers also 
viewed disenfranchisement along a continuum, intending the phrase “or other crime” to apply 
only to crimes of rebellion or disloyalty to the state, such as treason.  If this is true, then in the 
case of crimes other than rebellion and treasion, it is appropriate to proceed to the equal 
protection analysis.  Because Justice Marshall in his Ramirez dissent reached the equal protection 
analysis through another route, we already have an idea of what that analysis would look like.  
Marshall found in Ramirez that neither the state interests of preventing voter fraud nor of 
preventing felon group voting was compelling enough to disenfranchise former felons who have 
completely served their sentence, quite safe territory along the continuum of applicability.  The 
final section of the article attempts to go beyond Marshall’s analysis, proposing a generalized 
continuum of applicability for felon disenfranchisement in the United States.  Beginning with the 
existing continuum under rational basis scrutiny and the Ramirez understanding of the legislative 
history, it concludes by extrapolating to the future strict scrutiny paradigm. 
For better or worse, we live in a world where a few prisoners in Florida, if allowed to 
vote, could determine the election of the most powerful person on earth.  Felon 
disenfranchisement is definitely not a novel or merely academic question.  It is a serious question, 
not only for its potential to alter elections; not only for it potential to operate in a discriminatory 
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manner; not only for the interplay between felon disenfranchisement, prison location, and 
redistricting.  All of these reasons are important, but this article attempts to suggest another:  we 
should care about felon disenfranchisement because it inherently contradicts the rest of our 
constitutional jurisprudence on the right of every citizen to vote.  This article has suggested that it 
is time to re-examine the original textual premise of the Ramirez decision that section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively sanctions felon disenfranchisement.  Reviewing the 
legislative history of the framers, it argues that strict scrutiny is appropriate for felon 
disenfranchisement for the vast majority of crimes except those related to rebellion or disloyalty 
to the state, such as treason.  It concludes by suggesting some indication of what a continuum of 
applicability of felon disenfranchisement might look like under strict scrutiny.  Of course, a full 
constitutional dialogue under strict scrutiny will be a nuanced and laborious process, the work of 
judges and legislatures; but, if this article has clearly emphasized the need to revisit that 
constitutional dialogue, it has done its job. 
